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In the case of true crimes... courts can never abandon insistence upon the
evil intent as a prerequisite to criminality, partly because individual
interests can never be lost sight of and partly because the real menace to
social interests is the intentional, not the innocent, doer of harm.'
INTRODUCTION
Under the "responsible corporate officer" ("RCO") doctrine, a cor-
porate official can be held criminally liable for violating a so-called
"public welfare" or "regulatory" statute2 if the officer was in a position
to prevent or correct the violation and yet failed to do so.' The
defendant's actual knowledge is not required,4 and thus the RCO
doctrine results in the imposition of a species of strict criminal
liability.' Proponents who view the RCO doctrine as a serviceable
tenet of criminal jurisprudence-one that merits expanded applica-
tion-rely principally on two Supreme Court decisions, United States
v. Dotterweich6 and United States v. Park.7 Both cases involved prosecu-
tions under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"), which
contains no express mens rea requirement and imposes only
misdemeanor liability.9 In each case, the Court used "responsible
corporate officer" language, suggesting that the officer-defendant's
guilt could legitimately be inferred solely on the basis of the
individual's position within the company."° Because the defendants
in Dotterweich and Park purportedly were convicted "without any
1. Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 68 (1933).
2. See, e.g., Ronald M. Broudy, RCRA and the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine: Getting
Tough on Corporate Offenders by Sidestepping the Mens Rea Requirement, 80 KY. LJ. 1055, 1056-57
(1991/92) (stating that crimes containing no mens rea requirement often are termed
.regulatory" or "public welfare" offenses); Jeremy D. Heep, Comment, Adapting the Responsible
Corporate OfficerDoctrine in Light of United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 78 MINN.
L. REv. 699, 702 (1994) (asserting that Supreme Court developed RCO doctrine to "apply to
strict liability statutes protecting public welfare").
3. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673-74 (1975).
4. See id. at 670-71.
5. See Norman Abrams, Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers for Strict Liability Offenses-A
Comment on Dotterweich and Park, 28 UCLA L. REv. 463, 476 (1981) (noting that whenever
limited evidence of culpability suffices for finding of guilt, "convictions that would have occurred
were a strict liability approach applied will usually still occur").
6. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
7. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
8. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1994).
9. The FDCA prohibits, inter alia, "[t)he introduction or delivery for introduction into
interstate commerce of any food, drug, device or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded."
21 U.S.C. § 331 (a). Any person who violates § 331 is subject to imprisonment of not more than
one year, a fine of not more than $1000, or both. See id. § 333(a)(1).
10. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943) (noting that defendant must
have had "responsible share in the furtherance" of unlawful activity); see also Park, 421 U.S. at
665 n.9 (stating that defendant must have had "responsible relationship" to unlawful activity).
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conscious wrongdoing,"'" both opinions suggest that the Supreme
Court relied on the "public welfare" theory in holding the corporate
officers liable for the FDCA violations. 2 Courts have used this
theory to except certain criminal statutes from the mens rea require-
ment on the basis that: (1) the social benefit of a conviction for such
an offense far outweighs the significance of punishing the defendant;
and (2) public welfare provisions typically have carried small
penalties.
13
In recent years, several commentators have urged expansion of the
RCO doctrine to justify dispensing with or substantially diluting the
mens rea requirement under various statutes.' 4 This proposition has
been urged frequently with regard to environmental protection
laws.15 The rationale for expanding the doctrine's application is
that, like the FDCA, environmental protection laws also are "public
welfare" statutes designed to protect public "health and welfare."' 6
This Comment suggests that those commentators who urge
expanded application of the RCO doctrine offer reasons that have
11. Park, 421 U.S. at 665 n.9. As noted above, with respect to Park, this statement is not
quite accurate; in fact, the Court in Park expressly stated that "[t]he concept of a 'responsible
relationship' to, or a 'responsible share' in, a violation of the [FDCA] imports some measure
of blameworthiness." I. at 673; see also Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284 (stating that "[h]ardship
there doubtless may be under a statute [such as the FDCA] which... penalizes the transaction
though consciousness of wrongdoing be totally wanting").
12. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers for Strict Liability
Offenses-Another View, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1337,1356-62 (1982) (discussing "public welfare" nature
of offenses in Dotteiweich and Park and stating that "public welfare" legislation uses criminal
sanctions to regulate conduct that puts public at unacceptably high risk of danger).
13. See United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(explaining that "public welfare" offense constitutes most common exception to mens rea
requirements).
14. Seegenerally Marjorie P. Gabbett, Eroding the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act's Scienter
Requirement Regarding Responsible Corporate Officers, 14 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 49 (1993)
(reasoning that protection of public welfare and environment is stronger interest than
protection of corporate officers from criminal liability for acts of corporation); RobertA. Milne,
Comment, The Mens Rea Requirements of the Federal Environmental Statutes: Strict Ciminal Liability
in Substance But Not Form, 37 BUFF. L. REv. 307 (1989) (approving of strict criminal liability for
corporate officers operating on behalf of corporation).
15. SeeBrickey, supra note 12, at 1338-42 (exploring situations in which defendants have and
have not been found liable in RCO cases); infra Part III (examining post-Park environmental
cases in which RCO doctrine was treated).
16. See, e.g.,Joseph G. Block &Nancy A. Voisin, TheResponsible Corporate Officer Doctrine-Can
You Go to Jail for What You Don't Knowi?, 22 ENVFL. L. 1347, 1349-50 (1992) ("It is now well
established that environmental laws fall within the realm of health and welfare statutes, whose
purpose is to protect the general public.") (footnote omitted); Heep, supra note 2, at 725
(proposing that "[b ] ecause [an environmental statute] is undeniably a public welfare statute that
regulates inherently dangerous items ... courts [may] construe [it] in a way that furthers its
public welfare goals"); Colleen C. Mumane, Ciminal Sanctions forDeterrence Are a Needed Weapon,
But Self-Initiated Auditing Is Even Better Keeping the Environment Clean and Responsible Corporate
Officers Out ofJai4 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1181, 1189 (1994) (asserting that "[t]he fact that the statutes
aim at protecting the environment and remedying any problems which occur is evidence of an
intent to protect the public").
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nothing to do with the doctrine itself or, more specifically, have
nothing to do with the doctrinal implications of true "public welfare"
offenses. In effect, certain commentators reason that some doctrine
must be found to ease the government's burden of proof in these
cases merely because prosecuting high level corporate officials is often
an arduous task. 7 On a related tack, others argue that deterrence
justifies imposing strict criminal liability on corporate officers.18
None of the arguments offered, however, acknowledges the
inherent limitations on the RCO doctrine that flow from the narrow
circumstances in which the Supreme Court initially treated the
doctrine.1 9 Nor do they pay heed to the Court's recent expression
of disfavor for strict criminal liability.
20
Expansion of the RCO doctrine to the environmental arena, as
these commentators urge (and as has been approved by some
courts21), cannot be justified in view of. (1) the narrow holdings of
Dotterweich and Park; (2) the absence of any persuasive rationale for
analogizing the type of "public welfare" statute addressed in Dotterweich
and Park to modem environmental protection statutes; and (3) the
Supreme Court's recent strengthening of the statutory mens rea
requirement, in cases such as Staples v. United State? 2 and United States
v. X-Citement Video, Inc.
2 3
Part I of this Comment outlines the history of the mens rea
principle and the "public welfare" exception. Part II argues that
expansion of the RCO doctrine cannot bejustified. Part II also offers
a synopsis of recent Supreme Court cases that are relevant to the
RCO doctrine analysis. Part III discusses a sampling of post-Park cases
that have addressed the RCO doctrine. Part IV briefly summarizes the
thoughts of certain commentators on the application of the RCO
doctrine to environmental statutes. Part V recommends that use of
the RCO doctrine should be limited scrupulously in view of various
policy considerations surrounding its application. This Comment
concludes that the RCO doctrine cannot justifiably be extended to
17. See, e.g., Block & Voisin, supra note 16, at 1373 ("[P]rosecutors should focus their efforts
beyond the principal actors and seek the person in the corporation... who is responsible for
detecting problems.. . and has the authority for correcting them."); Heep, supra note 2, at 722
(rationalizing that it is unfair to hold low level employees responsible for acts directed by superi-
ors).
18. But see infra note 230 (contending that changed behavior may be result of factors other
than threat of strict liability).
19. See infra Part H1.A.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 225-26.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 191-206.
22. 114 S. Ct. 1793 (1994).
23. 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994).
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statutes expressly containing mens rea requirements. In addition, it
forecasts that, in light of the current trend toward maintaining and
even strengthening the mens rea requirement, the Supreme Court
would not employ the RCO doctrine to justify dispensing with or
diluting the mens rea element, even when a statute does not expressly
require criminal intent.
This Comment urges that because expansion of the RCO doctrine
to eviscerate or limit the mens rea principle will lead to an improvi-
dent and radical revision of settled principles of criminal liability, any
proposal to expand application of the doctrine must be scrutinized
carefully. 4 Moreover, this Comment maintains that the primary
purpose of the criminal law is to punish wrongdoers retrospectively,
and not to stimulate behavior prospectively. Finally, given the
Supreme Court's recent reaffirmation of the primacy of the mens rea
principle, this Comment projects that the Court likely would reject
any proposed expansion of the RCO doctrine to environmental
statutes.
I. THE MENS REA REQUIREMENT AND THE "PUBLIC WELFARE" OR
"REGULATORY" EXCEPTION
A. The Historical Underpinnings of the Mens Rea Requirement
For hundreds of years, Western nations have adhered to the
fundamental principle that an individual must possess mens rea-a
"guilty mind"-before being charged with a crime.2" This precept
dates at least to the time of Plato. 6  Plato posited that an ideal
criminal code should be based on an individual's level of intent; that
is, on whether the alleged perpetrator of a crime acted "with a
24. SeeAlan Zarky, The Responsible Corporate OffiuerDoctrine, 5 ToXics L. REP. (BNA) No. 31,
983, 983-84 (Jan. 9, 1991) ("[hif current criminal doctrines are ill-suited to resolving these
societal problems, it does not follow that changes in those doctrines are the solution.").
25. In a recent decision from the Eastern District of New York, Judge Weinstein discussed
extensively the history of the mens rea requirement in Anglo-American law, including the
"public welfare" exception. See United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 489-96
(E.D.N.Y. 1993); H.LA. HART, PUNISHMENTAND RESPONSIBILITY 114 (1968) (observing that"[a]I1
civilized penal systems make liability to punishment for at any rate serious crime dependent not
merely on the fact that the person to be punished has done the outward act of a crime, but on
his having done it in a certain state of frame of mind or will"); see also Edwin R. Keedy, Ignorance
and Mistake in the Criminal Law, 22 HARV. L. REV. 75, 81 (1908) ("It is a fundamental principle
of the criminal law, for which no authorities need be cited, that the doer of a criminal act shall
not be punished unless he has a criminal mind."); Sayre, supra note 1, at 56 ("Acts alone are
frequently colorless; it is the state of mind which makes all the difference between innocence
and criminality.").
26. See Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. at 490.
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rightful spirit and in a rightful manner."27 The philosopher's model
criminal code imposed no responsibility on those who acted uninten-
tionally.2"
English common law has long honored the mens rea require-
ment.29 Although the concept of mens rea did not crystallize until
the twelfth century, the level of a criminal's mental culpability was
considered in the determination of his punishment for most
established offenses before that time." Toward the close of the
Middle Ages, the focus on the putative criminal's state of mind
evolved more fully,3" and by the seventeenth century, English law
had firmly established that a guilty state of mind was an essential
element of most criminal charges and certainly of all serious
charges.12  In the mid-1800s, Blackstone touted the mens rea
requirement as follows:
[A] s a vicious will without a vicious act is no... crime, so, on the
other hand, an unwarrantable act without a vicious will is no crime
at all. So that to constitute a crime against human laws, there must
be, first, a vicious will, and secondly, an unlawful act consequent
upon such vicious will."
American criminal jurisprudence continues to pay strict heed to the
mens rea requirement. As Judge Weinstein has noted, "mens rea in
some form remains a defining and irreducible characteristic of the
criminal law."34 Another commentator has referred to the mens rea
requirement as an "orthodox fundamental principle of criminality,"3 5
and the Supreme Court has stated:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when
inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as
universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in
27. Id.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 489-92 (outlining history of mens rea requirement in criminal law).
30. See Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARv. L. REv. 974, 981 (1932).
31. See Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. at 491.
32. See id.; see also GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 30 (2d ed.
1961) (noting "[t ] he requirement ofa guilty state of mind (at least for serious crimes) had been
developed by the [seventeenth century]").
33. 2 WILLIAM BIACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *20-21.
34. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. at 492; see also 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW
§ 287 (9th ed. 1930) (asserting that "[tihere can be no crime large or small without an evil
mind").
35. Sayre, supra note 1, at 79; see also State v. Brown, 28 S.C.L. (1 Speers) 129, 131-32 (S.C.
1843) (stating that when one is charged with an unlawful act, "an averment of knowledge is
necessary").
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freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the
normal individual to choose between good and evil. 6
As the recent Supreme Court opinion in Staples v. United States'
7
confirms, the status of the mens rea requirement in our modem
jurisprudence compels the conclusion that exceptions to the doctrine
should be limited severely." The Court in Staples held that in order
for a defendant to be held criminally liable, the government must
prove that he had actual knowledge that he violated the law, even
when the relevant statute contains no express scienter requirement.
s9
B. The Evolution of the "Public Welfare" or "Regulatory" Exception
The term "public welfare offense" was coined in the middle of the
nineteenth century and refers to an exception to the fundamental
rule of American jurisprudence that a criminal conviction requires a
guilty mind.4" Implementation of this exception creates a form of
strict liability within the criminal law system41-an idea that, on its
face, runs counter to the very meaning of the word "crime."42
Early "public welfare" cases applied this strict liability standard to
minor regulatory violations involving the sale of liquor4" and adulter-
36. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952); see also Staples v. United States,
114 S. Ct. 1793, 1797 (1994) (stating that "'[t]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather
than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence'" (quoting
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978))).
37. 114S. Ct. 1793 (1994).
38. See infra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
39. See Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1804 (stating that "[s]ilence does not suggest that Congress
dispensed with mens rea for the element of [the statute] at issue").
40. SeeSayre, supra note 1, at 56, 62-63 (noting that concurrently, but independently of one
another, both England and United States embarked on movements toward disregarding mens
rea requirement in case of violations of certain regulatory statutes). One of the first "public
welfare" cases is an often-cited English decision, Hobbs v. Winchester Corp., 2 KB. 471 (1910). In
Hobbs, the court held that the defendant-butcher could be convicted under the Public Health
Act of 1875 for selling injurious meat "even though he and his assistants were unaware of the
unsoundness of the meat and could not have discovered it by any examination which they could
reasonably have been expected to make and even though the offense involved a maximum
penalty of three months imprisonment." Id at 483-85. In its analysis, the court reasoned: "A
man takes upon himself to offer goods to the public for their consumption with a view to
making a profit by the sale of them. Those goods may be so impregnated with disease as to
carry death or at any rate serious injury to the health to any one consuming them." Id.
41. See United States v.Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 668 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating
that those statutes deemed to be of"public welfare" genre, may be read without any mens rea
requirement).
42. See BLACK's L.AW DICTIONARY 55 (4th ed. 1968) (defining Actus nonfacit reum, nisi mens
sit Tea as "[a]n act does not make [the doer of it] guilty, unless the mind be guilty, that is, unless
the intent be criminal").
43. See, e.g., Barnes v. State, 19 Conn. 398 (1849) (holding that one could be convicted for
selling liquor to common drunkard, punishable by ten dollar fine, even if seller had no
knowledge that buyer was common drunkard).
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ated food.' Since that time, courts have held on occasion that the
"public welfare" principle justifies convicting otherwise innocent
individuals, those without intent to commit wrongdoing, in the
context of a select group of offenses.' This practice has been
condoned largely because it has been applied only to petty crimes and
misdemeanors carrying light penalties.4"
The significance of penalty severity with regard to the "public
welfare" designation is traceable to early English law47 and still is
weighed heavily by courts today.4 Indeed, the Supreme Court in
Staples indicated that in a society such as ours that generally requires
a "vicious will" to establish a crime, imposing harsh penalties for
offenses that require no mens rea would not make sense.49 The
Court in Staples further proclaimed that without express congressional
legislation indicating that mens rea is not required for a given offense,
the Court should not apply the "public welfare" rationale to construe
any felony statute as dispensing with the element.5"
II. THE RCO DOCTRINE AND THE LACK OF JUSTIFICATION
FOR ITS EXPANSION
A. The Narrow Holdings of Dotterweich and Park
As noted above, the "public welfare" exception arguably was applied
in both United States v. DotterweichP and United States v. Park-2 It is
from this concept and these cases that the RCO doctrine evolved.
Specifically, the RCO doctrine derives principally from dicta in the
Supreme Court's decision in Dotterweich.53 In Dotterweich, the presi-
44. See Sayre, supra note 1, at 64-65. In the 1860s Massachusetts was the first state to adopt
the "public welfare exception." See id. By 1868, the exception was accepted by several other
states as well. See id. at 66.
45. See infra Part III (discussing on RCO cases).
46. See Staples v. United States, 114 S. C. 1793, 1802 (1994) ("Historically, the penalty
imposed under a statute has been a significant consideration in determining whether the statute
should be construed as dispensing with mens rea."); see also Sayre, supra note 1, at 70 (explaining
that because public welfare offenses historically carried only small monetary penalties and not
imprisonment, "the courts [could) afford to disregard the individual in protecting the social
interest").
47. See Regina v. Tolson, 23 Q.B.D. 168, 177 (1889) (holding that when determining
whether to dispense with mens rea in criminal statute, "the nature and extent of the penalty
attached to the offense may reasonably be considered").
48. See infra Part II.C.
49. See Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1803 (citing 4 WLLIAM BLACESrONE, COMMENTARiES *21).
50. See id. at 1804. It should be remembered that the statute at issue in Staples was silent
as to a mens rea requirement; in that case, the Supreme Court read one into 26 U.S.C.
§ 5861(d).
51. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
52. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
53. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
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dent of a pharmaceutical distribution company was prosecuted under
the FDGA for introducing adulterated and misbranded drugs into
interstate commerce.5 4 The corporation purchased drugs from
manufacturers and then packaged, labeled, and shipped the products
for resale.5 The violations alleged in the indictment involved: (1)
the use of an old label that inaccurately stated one drug's ingredients;
and (2) the use of a second label that overstated the amount of an
ingredient in a second drug." The only issue before the Court,
however, was whether Congress intended the term "person," as used
in the FDCA to define the class of potential defendants, to include
individuals as well as corporations." The Court held that the
statutory term "person" included individuals.5" It then concluded
that Dotterweich was liable for the violations alleged.59
Despite the narrowness of its holding, Dotterweich has received
significant attention for its dicta. In particular, both courts and
commentators have noted that the Court in Dotterweich appears to
have endorsed the imposition of strict criminal liability on the
individual defendant.' It found that under the FDCA, an "offense
is committed.. . by all those who [have] a responsible share in the
furtherance of the transaction which the [FDCA] outlaws... though
consciousness of wrongdoing may be totally wanting."" In explain-
ing this view, the Court reasoned that a violation of the FDCA was
characterized as a "public welfare" offense62 and that by leaving a
mens rea requirement out of the statute, Congress opted to impose
the hardship of criminal prosecution on corporate officers "rather
than to throw the hazard on the innocent public who are wholly
helpless."6"
54. See United States v. Buffalo Pharmacal Co., 131 F.2d 500, 501 (2d Cir. 1942), rev'd sub
nom. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
55. See Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 278.
56. See Buffalo Phannacal, 131 F.2d at 500.
57. See Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 279.
58. See id. at 281-82.
59. See id. at 285.
60. See, e.g., Broudy, supra note 2, at 1057 (alleging that Court in Dotterweich established that
legislation written to promote public welfare could dispense with conventional mens rea
requirement).
61. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284. The Court declined to specify or even to offer an example
of those employees who may stand in such a "responsible relation." See id. at 285. Instead, it
left that decision to "the good sense of prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges [and]...
the ultimate judgment ofjuries." Id,
62. See id. at 284.
63. Md at 285.
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The principal point that certain commentators and a handful of
courts have either missed or ignored' is that the discussion of
"responsible share" liability-that is, the RCO doctrine-was unneces-
sary to resolve the only question before the Court.65 Thus, the
discussion was pure dicta and not a binding proclamation of law.
66
Three decades after Dotterweich, however, in United States v. Park,67
the Supreme Court again appeared to uphold the imposition of strict
criminal liability on a corporate officer-defendant who stood in a
position to prevent or remedy infractions of the FDCA.a The
defendant, as president and chief executive officer of a national food
chain, was convicted of violating the statute as a result of alleged
rodent infestation at some of the company's warehouses. 9 The facts
in Park were largely undisputed, demonstrating unequivocally that
Park had actual knowledge of the violations alleged.70 In light of
these facts and noting the "public welfare" rationale of Dotterweich, the
Court in Park held that the jury charge, which allowed a finding of
the officer's guilt if "it [was] clear ... that [he] had a responsible
relation to the [violation], ' 71 was not erroneous.72  The Court
found:
[T] he Government establishes a prima facie case [of liability under
the FDCA] when it introduces evidence sufficient to warrant a
finding by the trier of the facts that the defendant had, by reason
64. See, e.g., In reDougherty, 482 N.W.2d 485,489 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) ("The responsible
corporate officer doctrine is appropriate in the context of environmental laws."); infra Part IV.
65. It is significant to note that the Court in Dotterweich did not treat seriously the question
of what was necessary to find a corporate officer liable. The Court also failed to define a
"corporate officer" for purposes of the RCO doctrine. Addressing the former, the Court merely
set forth the "responsible share/responsible relation" language. See Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284-
85. Regarding the latter, the Court stated that to attempt to delineate which officers may stand
in such a "responsible" position would be "mischievous futility," leaving the question to trial
judges, juries, and prosecutors. See id. at 285.
66. SeeWainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 422 (1985) (stating that dicta are "not controlling"
statements of law (citing McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 141 (1981))); see also BLACK'S LAW
DlCrIoNARY 454 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "dicta" as "[e]xpressions in a court's opinion which
go beyond the facts before the court and therefore are individual views of the author of opinion
and not binding in subsequent cases as legal precedent").
67. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
68. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673 (1975) (discussing Congress' intent "to
enforce the accountability of responsible corporate agents... and the obligation of the courts
... to give ... effect [to relevant laws]").
69. See id. at 660.
70. Evidence showed that a Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") inspector's express
instruction to the defendant to eradicate the infestation problem in order to ensure the
company's "compliance with the law" substantially was ignored. See id. at 663-64. Evidence also
showed that Park had conferred with the company's vice president of legal affairs regarding the
FDA warning. See id.
71. lId at 665 n.9.
72. See id. at 674-75 (stating that instruction, viewed in full, did not allow jury to find guilt
solely on basis of officer's position).
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of his position in the corporation, responsibility and authority
either to prevent in the first instance, or promptly to correct the
violation complained of, and that he failed to do so. The failure
thus to fulfill the duty imposed by the interaction of the corporate
agent's authority and the statute furnishes a sufficient causal
link.73
In light of the Court's later comment that some blameworthiness was
necessary for a conviction under the Act 4-- notwithstanding its
"responsible share" or "responsible relation" language-and, in
particular, taking into consideration the facts of the case, the above
quotation cannot be viewed as a holding and certainly cannot be
interpreted as an unequivocal endorsement of the RCO doctrineY
5
The crucial point in Park, in light of recent calls for expansion of
the RCO doctrine, is that the defendant plainly had knowledge of the
violations alleged. 6 Indeed, Park admitted receiving notice from the
federal Food and Drug Administration of unsanitary conditions at one
of the company's warehouses after agents had inspected the build-
ing,"7 and evidence showed that two subsequent inspections revealed
that the problems had not been substantially cured.78
It should be reiterated that the FDCA, under which both Dotterweich
and Park were decided, contains no express mens rea requirement.79
As per Staples, such an omission does not, in and of itself, dispense
with the element. However, considering the inconsequential nature
of the penalties attached to the FDCA, punishment of an unintention-
al violation seems justifiable, subject to due process requirements.
Nevertheless, Dotterweich and Park provide no basis for the punishment
of an unintentional act under a statute requiring scienter as a
73. 1& at 673-74.
74. See id. at 674.
75. The trial judge in Park perceived the weakness of the jury instruction, noting that it
failed to specify a minimum standard of liability under the "responsible relation" test; but he felt
obligated to let it stand under Dotterweich. See id. at 679-80 (StewartJ., dissenting). In response
to a request for clarification of the term "responsible relationship," the district courtjudge said:
"Let me say this, simply as to the definition of the 'responsible relationship.'
Dotterweich and subsequent cases have indicated this really is ajury question. It says it
is not even subject to being defined by the Court. As I have indicated to counsel, I am
quite candid in stating that I do not agree with the decision; therefore I am going to
stick by it."
Id. at 680 n.1 (StewartJ, dissenting).
76. See id. at 661-65 & n.9.
77. See id. at 664.
78. See id. at 661-62.
79. See supra note 9 (quoting relevant portion of FDCA, in which there exists no scienter
requirement); see also Barry M. Hartman & Charles A. De Monaco, The Present Use of the
Responsible Corporate OfficerDoctrine in the Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, 23 ENVTL. L.
REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,145,10,147 (Mar. 1993) (observing that in Dotterweich,Justice Frankfurter
recognized that "the statute itself eliminated the knowledge requirement").
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predicate to the imposition of criminal liability."0 Such a require-
ment is present in the vast majority of environmental protection
statutes, including those to which it has been suggested that the RCO
doctrine apply.8
B. The "Public Welfare" Rationale of Dotterweich and Park
Neither Dotterweich nor Park suggests or even alludes to expanding
the applicability of the RCO doctrine. Nonetheless, certain commen-
tators suggest that the doctrine be extended to statutes other than the
strict liability FDCA-the only statute for which the Supreme Court
even arguably has condoned its use-and a handful of courts
ostensibly have acquiesced. 2 Both groups rationalize such an
application on the theory that these offenses are "public welfare"
offenses in the same sense that the term has applied to the sale of
adulterated or misbranded food and drugs.8 3 As noted earlier in this
Comment, this suggestion has been made mostly within the context
of environmental laws.
There is no question that environmental protection statutes aim to
safeguard the "public welfare." The characterization of a statute as a
"public welfare" enactment, however, is so broad as to be analytically
meaningless. One similarly could label most, if not all, statutes.8 4
Because there is no sound method by which a court could determine
which unlawful activities pose the "greatest" danger to the public or
which wrongs cause the "most" harm, the "worst" harm or the "most"
human misery, no court should arbitrarily broaden the "public
welfare" rubric to negate the requisite mens rea of a particular
statute. 5 Thus, applying a test that asks only if the statute aims to
protect some aspect of the public's well-being does not meaningfully
80. See United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873, 894-95 (E.D. Wash. 1991) (addressing
significance of "knowing" requirement under RORA). The court in White contrasted the
environmental statute at issue from the FDCA, noting- "[We] must recognize that the statutes
involved in Park and Dotterweich require no mental state or action." Id. at 895. The court
refused to hold the defendant in White liable under the RCO doctrine. See id.
81. See infra Part III and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts have applied
RCO doctrine).
82. See id.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 667 (3d Cir. 1984)
(concluding that "in RCRA, no less than in the Food and Drugs Act, Congress endeavored to
control hazards that, 'in the circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely beyond self-
protection'" (quoting United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943))).
84. SeeJAMES B. HADDAD ET AL, CASES AND COMMENTS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 488 (4th
ed. 1992) ("Can it not be said that enforcement of all criminal laws have some public welfare
purpose?").
85. Also, as was noted by the Court in Staples, contrary to the suggestion of the dissent in
that case, the mens rea requirement is a question of law to be decided by the court-it is not
an issue for the jury. See Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1800-01 n.6 (1994).
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differentiate between regulatory "public welfare" laws and other types
of statutes. 86  Consequently, if a statute's broad "public welfare"
purpose was the sole criterion by which to determine whether mens
rea should be ignored, the exception would swallow the rule, thereby
eviscerating the tenet that crimes should be the product of a truly
culpable mind.
Furthermore, extending the application of the RCO doctrine to
felonies-environmental or otherwise-cannot be justified based on
the magnitude of punishments imposed for such crimes. The
importance of the penalty attached to a given statute must be
recognized before interpreting its violation as a "public welfare"
offense. Historically, this factor has been significant in determining
whether and to what extent a showing of mens rea should be required
for a conviction.87 As noted above, one of the distinguishing
features of traditional "public welfare" offenses is that they typically
have been limited to statutes calling for "only light penalties such as
fines or shortjail sentences, not imprisonment in the state penitentia-
ry.," The defendants in Dotterweich and Park, for instance, were
charged with misdemeanors, both of which involved insignificant
pecuniary fines and neither of which called for imprisonment. 9
The stigma attached to a person with criminal status in today's
society, where both personal and professional success are largely
dependent upon reputation, is yet another reason that the RCO
doctrine should be applied sparingly.9" From this perspective, it is
difficult to justify utilizing the RCO doctrine to dilute mens rea
requirements for environmental crimes, as most constitute felonies
calling for lengthy imprisonment, substantial monetary fines, or
both.9'
86. See HAD)DAD, supra note 84, at 3.
87. See L PERKINS, CRiMiNAL LAv 793-98 (2d ed. 1969) (suggesting that when deciding
whether to categorize act as "public welfare" offense, analysis should begin with consideration
of its prescribed penalty).
88. Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1802-03 (citing Commonwealth v. Raymond, 97 Mass. 567 (1867)
(carrying fine of up to $200 or six months imprisonment, or both); Commonwealth v. Farren,
91 Mass. 489 (1864) (carrying small fine); and People v. Snowberger, 71 N.W. 497 (Mich. 1897)
(carrying fine of up to $500 or brief imprisonment)).
89. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 666 (1975) (resulting in fine of $50 per count
for five counts, or $250, cumulatively); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943)
(assessing fine of $500 for each of three counts charged and probation for 60 days on each
count, to run concurrentiy); see also 21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (1) (1994) (providing that "[a~ny person
who violates a provision of section 301 [21 U.S.C. § 331] shall be imprisoned for not more than
one year or fined not more than $1,000, or both").
90. Cf. Zarky, supra note 24, at 994 (noting that RCO doctrine could send individual to
prison for several years because of events over which he had no practical control).
91. See Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1802 (opining that "[ilt is unthinkable to us that Congress
intended to subject such law-abiding, well-intentioned citizens to a possible ten-year term of
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Finally, it is relevant to consider the historical context in which the
Court decided Dotterweich and in which the RCO doctrine was
spawned. 2 The ominous view of the "evils" of "big business" that
prevailed in the late 1930s and 1940s almost certainly played some
role in the case's outcome. Such a view is not compelling today, as
business enterprises are commonplace and no longer are a mystery to
the average citizen. Moreover, the current Supreme Court appears
to attribute more importance to an individual's right to be free from
wrongful criminal conviction than it does to the protection of the
public welfare.
93
C. The Supreme Court's Recent Reaffirmation and Strengthening of the
Mens Rea Requirement
Post-Park Supreme Court decisions consistently have reaffirmed and
strengthened the mens rea requirement, often reading culpability
requirements into statutes that, by their literal terms, contain none. 4
Moreover, most of the relevant case law has emphasized the narrow-
ness of the "public welfare" exception.
9 5
imprisonment if... what they genuinely and reasonably believed was [lawful activity] turns out
to have [been unlawful]").
92. See generally WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY: THE NEW LEGALITY 1932-1968, at 3-27 (1970). Swindler observes:
The developments of the postwar era had "cleared the way for the claims of a group
far wider than either the owners or the control. They have placed the community in
a position to demand that the modern corporation serve not alone the owners or the
control but all society."
Id. at 24 (quoting ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 355-56 (1932)).
93. See infra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
94. See, &g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464, 468 (1994) (adopting
presumption that scienter requirement should apply to each statutory element that criminalizes
otherwise innocent conduct); Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1747, 1753-54
(1994) (requiring proof that defendant knowingly made use of interstate conveyance in scheme
to sell drugs when word "knowingly" is absent from statute prohibiting such conduct); Ratzlaf
v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 657 (1994) (holding that, where defendant was convicted of
structuring financial transactions to avoid currency reporting requirements, government must
prove defendant "willfully violated" antistructuring law by knowingly violating law); Liparota v.
United States, 471 U.S. 419, 42-26 (1985) (ruling that, where defendant was convicted of
unlawfully acquiring and possessing food stamps, government must prove defendant knew his
acquisition and/or possession was unlawful); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438
U.S. 422, 438 (1978) ("Certainly far more than the simple omission of the appropriate phrase
from the statutory definition is necessary to justify dispensing with an intent requirement.").
95. See, ag., X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 468-69 ("Persons do not harbor settled
expectations that the contents of magazines and film are generally subject to stringent
regulation."); Liparota, 471 U.S. at 432-33 (finding that unauthorized food stamp possession did
not constitute "public welfare" offense and distinguishing such violation from hand grenade
possession and adulterated drug sale).
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The Court's decision in Staples v. United States is illustrative.97
In Staples, the defendant-petitioner was charged with possessing an
unregistered machine gun in violation of the National Firearms Act
("NFA"),98 a statute that is silent with respect to mens rea.99 Al-
though the gun in question originally was a semi-automatic weapon
that would not have required registration under the NFA, it had been
modified to operate in a fully automatic fashion, bringing it within
the scope of the statute." ° At trial the defendant testified that the
weapon never had fired automatically while in his possession and that
he had no knowledge of its automatic firing capability. 1 The trial
court, however, declined to instruct the jury that it must find that the
defendant knew of the weapon's automatic firing capability10 2 and
Staples was convicted. He subsequently was sentenced to five years'
imprisonment and fined $5000.1°3 The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction.0 4
The Supreme Court held in Staples that the Government should
have been required to prove that the defendant had actual knowledge
of those characteristics which brought the weapon within the statutory
proscription, even absent an express knowledge requirement in the
NFA °5 The Government offered two related arguments, both of
which the Court rejected."°6
The Government argued first that because Congress intended the
NFA to "regulate and restrict the circulation of dangerous weap-
ons,"'0 7 Staples' violation of the NFA should be characterized as a
96. 114 S. CL 1793 (1994).
97. Although Staples does not address the issue of corporate officer liability, the mens rea
and "public welfare" analyses presumably would be equivalent in that context.
98. 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1994).
99. The relevant portion of the NFA states only that "[i ] t shall be unlawful for any person
... to receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms
Registration and Transfer Record." Id.
100. See Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1796.
101. See id.
102. See id. The jury instruction given in Staples provided:
The Government need not prove the defendant knows he's dealing with a weapon
possessing every last characteristic [which subjects it) to the regulation. It would be
enough to prove he knows that he is dealing with a dangerous device of a type as




105. See Id. at 1804. In a concurring opinionJustice Ginsberg noted that not only must the
defendant have known he was dealing with a dangerous device, but he also must have known
that such possession violated the law. See id. at 1806 (GinsburgJ., concurring). "I conclude that
conviction under [this section of the NFA] requires proof that the defendant knew he possessed
not simply a gun, but a machine gun." Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
106. See id. at 1804.
107. Id. at 1797.
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"public welfare" or "regulatory" offense.' As discussed above,
courts have construed statutes proscribing such offenses as imposing
strict criminal liability on violators, thus justifying conviction absent
a showing of mens rea.10 9 The Government pointed out that the
Supreme Court has so interpreted statutes governing the illegal sale
of narcotics,"' the illegal possession of unregistered grenades,"'
and the illegal shipment of adulterated or misbranded food or
drugs,"' all of which were silent as to requisite mens rea.1
In addressing the Government's first contention, the Court noted
that the relevant discussion in Dotterweich, which involved allegedly
adulterated and misbranded drugs, was mere "dicta" and therefore
did not address that case at any length." 4 Instead it focused on the
cases that upheld criminal liability without evidence of mens rea, for
the sale of narcotics and unregistered grenades."'
First, the Court looked to the public welfare designation of the
narcotics offense." 6 In United States v. Balint,"7 a 1922 case in
which the Court addressed a violation of the Anti-Narcotic Act of
1914."' The Supreme Court in Balint invoked the public welfare
rationale and concluded that a conviction under the Act required
proof only that the defendant knew that he was selling drugs; not that
he knew the specific items he had sold were "narcotics.""' The
Court in Staples, however, refused to subscribe to such reasoning. It
explained that a corresponding instruction would permit a conviction
solely on the basis that Staples knew he possessed a "firearm" in the
ordinary sense of the word.20 Given the widespread lawful use of
108. See id.
109. See generally Sayre, supra note 1.
110. See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 (1922) (addressing violation of Anti-
Narcotic Act of 1914).
111. See United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 602 (1971) (addressing hand grenade
possession as violation of NFA).
112. See supra Part II.A (discussing Park and Dotterwdch).
113. See Balnt, 258 U.S. at 254 n.1 (citing pertinent portion of Anti-Narcotic Act of 1914);
Freed, 401 U.S. at 604 n.3 (citing pertinent portion of NFA); see also supra Part II.A.
114. See Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1797-98 (1994).
115. See id. at 1793 (discussing Balint and Freed).
116. See id. at 1797-98.
117. 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
118. Act of Dec. 17, 1914, 38 Stat. 785, 786.
119. SeeUnited States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250,253-54 (1922) (characterizingAnti-Narcotic Act
as taxing act, with incidental purpose of minimizing spread of addiction to the use of poisonous
and demoralizing drugs).
120. Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1798, 1799 (distinguishing guns from grenades in Freed and drugs
in Balint on basis that guns have enjoyed "a long tradition of widespread lawful... ownership").
LIMITATIONS ON THE RCO DOCTRINE
guns,... the Court observed that this would lead to a result clearly
at odds with the mens rea principle.
122
Next, the Court in Staples analyzed United States v. Freed,123 a 1971
case addressing a violation of the same section of the NFA that was at
issue in Staples. 1 4 The Court determined in Freed that the unlawful
possession of unregistered grenades could properly be termed a
public welfare offense." In that case, neither party disputed that
the defendant knew that the objects he possessed were grenades. 6
The defendant claimed, however, that he did not know that the
explosive devices were unregistered. 2 7 The Court held that mens
rea as to the registration element of the offense was not required and
upheld the defendant's conviction.1 2 1 It reasoned that the NFA "is
a regulatory measure in the interest of the public safety, which may
well be premised on the theory that one would hardly be surprised to
learn that possession of hand grenades is not an innocent act."
29
Although the Government in Staples asserted that the gun at issue
should be treated as the equivalent of the grenades in Freed,"s° the
Court refused to assign the public welfare label to the NFA violation
under the relevant facts.'' The Court stated that the classification
in Freed "rested entirely on the assumption that the defendant knew"
his possession of the weapons in question "was not entirely 'innocent'
in and of itself.1132  The Court in Staples concluded that although
innocent gun ownership is commonplace, one in possession of
grenades reasonably can be expected to know that such weapons are
used only as implements of destruction. S3
121. See id. at 1800 (stating that gun ownership is generally innocent act).
122. See id. Even more cogent an argument can be made against criminalizing the disposal
of waste products. Certainly, society wants to promote such lawful activity for the betterment of
individual communities and the environment in general.
123. 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
124. See Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1798-99 (discussing 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d)).
125. See United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971) ("This is a regulatory measure in
the interest of the public safety.").
126. See id.
127. See id. Contrary to the analysis in Staples, the Court in Freed held that because the Act
did not have an express scienter requirement, specific intent was not necessary. See id. at 607.
128. See id. at 609-10.
129. Id. at 609 (stating that grenades at issue were no less dangerous than narcotics at issue
in Baint).
130. See Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1800 n.5 (1994) (noting Government's
contention that "'one would hardly be surprised to learn' that there are laws that affect one's
rights of gun ownership" (quoting Freed 401 U.S. at 609)).
131. See id. at 1799-800.
132. Id. at 1800 (reasoning that, in general, guns are not "'deleterious devices or products
or obnoxious waste materials,"' as were grenades in Freed and drugs in Balint (quoting United
States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971))).
133. See id. at 1799.
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As for the Government's second argument, it urged that Freed's
logic should apply in Staples because guns, no less than grenades, are
"highly dangerous" instruments and those who deal in them should
be aware of the probability of regulation." The Court rejected this
argument as well, stating that merely because something is
"'dangerous' in some general sense, does not necessarily suggest...
that it is not also entirely innocent."135 The Court emphasized the
unusual care which it has taken to avoid construing statutes so as to
dispense with a mens rea requirement when this would "criminalize
a broad range of apparently innocent conduct."' 6 It observed that
precisely such an outcome would result in Staples from the implemen-
tation of the government's theory that whenever an item is potentially
hazardous, the hazard alone warrants dispensing with a culpability
requirement.137
Because the Court in Staples went to some length to avoid extend-
ing the public welfare rationale to the same section of the NFA that
previously sufficed for such a designation in Freed, it is likely that the
Court would be less than receptive to expanding it otherwise."
Indeed, this seems an afortiori conclusion: the NFA, as construed in
Staples, contains no explicit mens rea requirement while most
environmental statutes do.
39
The Supreme Court in Staples 4 emphatically reaffirmed that,
absent a clear expression of legislative intent to omit any mens rea
134. See id. (suggesting that Court analogize guns in Staples to adulterated food in
Dotteaweich).
135. Id. at 1800.
136. Id. (citing Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985)). It is significant to note
here that not only is the responsible treatment of hazardous waste a lawful activity, but it is an
absolute necessity that society should seek to encourage.
137. See id. at 1801-02.
138. See id. at 1797. The Court in Staples emphasized repeatedly that the mens rea
requirement is a fundamental concept within the criminal law system and that some showing
of congressional intent is necessary to dispense with that element of a crime. See id. at 1797-98;
see also United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464,468 (1994) (noting presumption
favoring mens rea in all criminal contexts).
139. Two environmentally-related statutes that do not contain mens rea requirements are:
(1) The Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1994); and (2) The Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16
U.S.C. § 707 (1994). Prosecutors, however, have not litigated the RCO doctrine in federal
courts in association with these statutes; they have sought to apply the theory only to those
environmental statutes with "knowing" requirements. See infra Part III.
140. The holdings of Staples and X-Citemen4 and in particular, their strong reiteration of the
mens rea requirement, were prefigured in recent years. In United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978), the Court noted the generally disfavored status of criminal laws that
seek to dispense with a mens rea requirement. In Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. United States, 114 S.
Ct. 1747 (1994), the Court reaffirmed that "[c]ertainly far more than the simple omission of the
[word 'knowingly'] from the statutory definition [of an offense] is necessary tojustify dispensing
with an intent requirement." Id. at 1752-53 (quoting United States Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 438); see
also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1952) (holding that criminal intent of
defendant was essential element of the statutory crime at issue).
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element, a criminal statute must be presumed to impose such a
requirement with respect to each element of a crime. 41 Other
recent Supreme Court decisions are in harmony with Staples in finding
that criminal statutes require a showing of criminal intent even when
the statute is silent on the subject. 42
In United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,"4 the Court confronted
the issue of whether a child pornography statute, which explicitly
required the "knowing" transportation or distribution of child
pornography, also required that the defendant have knowledge that
the material in question in fact depicted a minor child.144 The
statute was silent as to this element."4 The Court conceded that,
given the express statutory language, the most natural grammatical
reading of the provision suggested that the statutory term "knowingly"
modified only the verbs-transports, ships, receives, distributes, or
reproduces-and did not address knowledge of whether the pornogra-
phy in question involved a minor.4' Relying in significant part on
the analysis in Staples, however, the Court stated that, contrary to the
government's position, the "plain language reading of [the statute
was] not so plain."47 The Court then applied the presumption in
favor of a scienter requirement, rejecting the "public welfare"
rationale proffered for eliminating the application of the modifier
"knowingly" to every element of the statute.' 4
Like that of Staples, the import of X-Citement is clear: the Supreme
Court is not ready to dispense with mens rea when a statute is silent
141. See Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1797.
142. See X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 468 (stating that Court has required showing of mens
rea even when statutes have been silent as to that element). But see United States v.
International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 564-65 (1971). In International Minerals,
the defendant was charged with unlawfully shipping sulfuric acid and hydrofluosilicic acid in
interstate commerce for failing to make proper notation on the requisite shipping papers, in
violation of an Interstate Commerce Commission regulation. See id. at 559. The provision
applied to those who "knowingly violate[d]" the statute. See id. Notwithstanding this knowledge
requirement, however, the Supreme Court found the defendant criminally liable without proving
knowledge, stating that "where... dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious
waste materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so great that anyone who is aware
that he is in possession of them or dealing with them must be presumed to be aware of the
regulation." Id. at 565. The view of the dissent in International Minerals is more consistent with
the current Court's belief that the mens rea principle should be adhered to strictly. See id. at
569 (StewartJ, dissenting) (describing majority's decision as "a perversion of the purpose of
criminal law").
143. 115 S. Ct. 464, 464 (1994).
144. See X-Citeinent Video, 115 S. Ct. at 465 (1994).
145. See id. at 467; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (1994) ("Any person who knowingly transports
or ships in interstate or foreign commerce or mails anyvisual depiction, if the producing of such
visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct . .
146. See X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 467.
147. Id. at 468.
148. See id. at 468-70.
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as to that element; and it is certainly not ready to impose strict
liability or to dilute mens rea when a statute explicitly requires proof
of a defendant's criminal intent.1
49
III. POST-PARK ENVIRONMENTAL CASES IN WHICH THE RCO
DOCTRINE WAS TREATED
A clear majority of courts has declined to impose strict criminal
liability in environmental cases examining the RCO doc-
trine-especially in cases in which the applicable statute has contained
an explicit mens rea requirement.5  Unfortunately, however,
several of these cases reached correct conclusions with confusing and
misleading language.' Such careless expressions might be miscon-
strued in future cases, leading to incorrectjury instructions, incorrect
results, or both.1
52
For simplicity's sake, it is helpful to divide the RCO cases into three
distinct categories: (1) those in which courts refused to hold the
defendant-officer liable under the RCO doctrine; (2) those in which
the defendant-officer supposedly was convicted under the doctrine,
but in which the facts make clear that the officer possessed actual
knowledge of the violations at issue; and (3) those in which a type of
"status" offense was created and the defendant-officer was held liable
based solely on his official corporate position.
The most notable case in the first category is United States v.
MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.' 51 In MacDonald & Watson the
149. But see United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1993). In Weitzenhoff, two
corporate officials were convicted under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2).
This section makes it a felony to "knowingly" discharge pollutants into navigable waters without
a permit. See id. at 1283. The trial court construed the statute to require that the defendants
knew that they were discharging pollutants, but not necessarily to require knowedge that the
discharges were unlawful. See id. Rejecting the contention that Staples dictated a different result,
the Ninth Circuit held that because the CWA was a "public welfare" statute and because a
polluter must be deemed to be on notice that his acts may pose a public danger, the imposition
of criminal liability even absent any showing of knowledge of wrongdoing was justified. See id.
at 1285-86 (citing United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943)). The Ninth Circuit
in Weitzenhoff concluded that Staples did not preclude the "public welfare" label from being
applied to felonies. See id. at 1281. Although this reading is technically correct, the Weitzenhoff
decision is at odds with the essence of Staples and the fundamental mens rca principle.
150. See infra notes 153-90 and accompanying text.
151. See infra text accompanying notes 143-90.
152. See Zarky, supra note 24, at 994. Zarky notes that the axiom that "hard cases make bad
law" is well-founded. See id. He explains that when faced with an officer under whose direction
substantial environmental damage has occurred, a court likely will uphold a conviction. He
warns, however, that the court may not adequately consider the implications of its holding for
future sets of facts. See id. Moreover, Zarky emphasizes that "[t]he criminal law ... is full of
examples of an evolution in doctrine that never was intended by the judges of the individual
cases." Id.
153. 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
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defendant, a corporate officer, was convicted of knowingly transport-
ing hazardous waste to a facility without a permit, thereby violating
§ 6928(d) (1) of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA").' 54 Although the district court did not find that the
defendant was cognizant of the unlawful act, it permitted the jury to
infer the defendant's knowledge solely on the basis of his corporate
status.
155
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the convic-
tion. 56 That court held that although the officer had both control
over the transportation of the waste and knowledge of similar prior
violations, the RCO instruction could not serve as a substitute for the
requisite mens rea with respect to the offense at issue.' 57 The court
explained that a factfinder validly may consider an officer's position
and responsibilities along with other evidence in determining whether
he possessed actual knowledge of an offense, 158  but that a
defendant's organizational status and responsibility, without more,
does not suffice as evidence of criminal intent.
59
154. See United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35,39 (1st Cir. 1991);
see also 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1) (1994) (stating that "criminal penalties" apply to "[a]ny person
who ... knowingly transports or causes to be transported any hazardous waste identified or
listed under this subchapter to a facility which does not have a (proper permit]").
155. See MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d at 50-51 (applying RCO jury instruction).
156. See id. at 55.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id; Hartman & De Monaco, supra note 79, at 10,152 (stating clearly that individual's
status, without more, is insufficient basis on which to instigate criminal prosecution against that
individual for environmental violation containing"knowing" requirement); see also United States
v. Ramagosa, No. 3:CR-91-079 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (issuing instruction that comports with settled
mens rea doctrine). The jury in Ramagosa was instructed as follows:
The element of knowledge can seldom be shown by direct evidence. Usually it is
established from all the facts and surrounding circumstances. In determining the issue
of knowledge, therefore, you may consider the entire conduct of the defendant at or
near the time of the alleged offense including any statements made or acts done by the
defendant. You may consider whether relevant circumstantial evidence establishes
whether the defendant knew of the violations charged in the indictment.
Among the circumstances you may consider in determining a defendant's knowledge
is his position in the corporation, including his responsibilities under the regulations
and under any applicable corporate policies and his activities as a corporate executive.
Thus, you may infer that the defendant knew certain facts by virtue of his position in
the corporation, his relationship to other employees or any applicable corporate
policies and other facts and circumstances including information provided to the
defendant on prior occasions. If the defendant was an officer of the corporation, you
may consider whether the defendant was the corporate officer who had primary and
direct responsibility over the activities which gave rise to the violations charged in
determining whether he had knowledge of the charged violations.
Hartman & De Monaco, supra note 79, at 10,152-53.
THE AMERICAN UNIvERsny LAw REVIEw [Vol. 46:543
The First Circuit in MacDonald & Watson found that the jury
instruction issued by the district court1" allowed the defendant to
be found guilty based merely on negligence, that is, upon proof only
that he was aware of previous illegal shipments but not of those on
which the criminal charges were based. 61 Accordingly, it reversed
and remanded the case.162 In distinguishing Dotterweich and Park,
the court noted that: (1) both Supreme Court cases involved a
statute "lacking an express knowledge ... or scienter requirement"
(the FDCA), in contrast to RCRA's explicit knowledge require-
ment;163 and (2) the defendants in those cases were subject only to
misdemeanor penalties, and not the felonious liability at stake in
MacDonald & Watson.1"4 The court stated, "We have found no case,
and the Government cites none, where ajury was instructed that the
defendant could be convicted of a federal crime expressly requiring
knowledge as an element, solely by reason of a conclusive, or 'mandatory'
presumption of knowledge of the facts constituting the offense."
l'
Like the court in MacDonald & Watson, the court in United States v.
White rejected the proposition that a corporate officer could be
convicted of unlawfully disposing of waste under RCRA absent proof
of actual knowledge. 67 The court in White maintained that the
Government could not sustain its burden of proof merely by showing
that the defendant "should have known" of the alleged violations in
that case.1 The court also distinguished the application of the
RCO doctrine to RCRA from its application to the FDCA in Dotterweich
and Park, as did the First Circuit in MacDonald & Watson, noting that
the FDCA contained no express knowledge requirement. 69
160. See MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d at 50-51. The trial court issued the following jury
instruction:
First, it must be shown that the person is an officer of the corporation, not merely an
employee. Second, it must be shown that the officer had direct responsibility for the
activities that are alleged to be illegal. Simply being an officer or even the president
of a corporation is not enough. The Government must prove that the person had a
responsibility to supervise the activities in question. And the third requirement is that
the officer must have known or believed that the illegal activity of the type alleged
occurred.
Id.
161. See id. at 55.
162. See id. at 51-54 (stating that under district court's instruction, as long as officer knew or
even erroneously believed that unlawful activity of same type occurred on another occasion, he
could be held liable).
163. See id. at 51-52 (outlining statute's "knowing" requirement).
164. See id.
165. Id. at 53.
166. 766 F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
167. United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873, 895 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
168. See id.
169. See id. at 894-95.
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The second category of cases consists of those in which the facts
satisfactorily demonstrated the defendant's actual knowledge of
wrongdoing, but the court seemingly relied, at least in part, on the
RCO doctrine nevertheless. In this group, the Tenth Circuit often is
credited with offering the most expansive view of the doctrine."'
In United States v. Brittain,"' that court upheld the conviction of a
defendant-officer found guilty of discharging pollutants into certain
waters" in violation of the Clean Water Act ("CWA).' Given
that copious evidence pointed to the defendant's actual knowledge of
the unlawful dumping,"7 his conviction is consistent with the
fundamental mens rea requirement of American criminal law.'
75
More specifically, it is consistent with the CWA's express knowledge
requirement.'76 The court in Brittain, however, opened the door for
confusion by stating:
We interpret the addition of "responsible corporate officers" [to the
CWA] as an expansion of liability under the Act rather than... [a]
limitation.... Under this interpretation, a "responsible corporate
officer," to be held criminally liable, would not have to "willfully or
negligently" cause a ... violation. Instead, the willfulness or
negligence of the actor would be imputed to him by virtue of his
position of responsibility.'77
On close analysis, it is clear that the Tenth Circuit's expansive
language in Brittain is unwarranted dicta. As the court itself noted,
the jury in that case considered the defendant's specific conduct and
170. See Brenda S. Hustis &John Y. Gotanda, The Responsible Corporate Officer. Designated Felon
or Legal Fiction F, 25 LOY. U. CHI. LJ. 169, 178 (1994) (stating that Brittain opinion represents
broadest application of RCO doctrine to environmental statute).
171. 931 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1991).
172. See United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413, 1414 (10th Cir. 1991).
173. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1994). A negligent violator of § 1311 "shall be punished by
a fine of not less than $2,500 nor more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment
for not more than 1 year, or by both." Id. § 1319(c) (1). A knowing violator "shall be punished
by a fine of not less than $5,000 nor more than $50,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment
for not more than 3 years, or by both." Id. § 1319(c) (2).
174. See id. at 1420 (noting evidence that: (1) defendant physically observed both violations
complained of; (2) defendant was informed that illegal discharges (such as those complained
of) were prone to occur in case of heavy rains; (3) defendant reviewed logs that recorded
company's repeated illegal discharges; (4) defendant instructed plant supervisor on several
occasions not to report violations to EPA as was required by applicable permit, and (5) when
advised that company was required to alert EPA to relevant discharges, defendant replied to
subordinate, "Don't worry about it.").'
175. See supra text accompanying notes 34-39.
176. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). In pertinent part, this section prohibits "any person" from
discharging "any pollutant" into the waters of the United States without an EPA or EPA
authorized agency permit. See id. § 1311 (a). Section 1319(c) mandates that such a violation be
"willful" or "negligent." See id. § 1319(c).
177. Brittain, 931 F.2d at 1419.
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did not base its decision solely on the officer's corporate position. 78
Additionally, the court indicated that it was not applying a strict
liability standard to the case. 179 Therefore, because Brittain suggests
that the court would have found the defendant guilty based solely on
the officer's job description (i.e., absent any proof of the defendant's
actual knowledge of wrongdoing), the holding in the case is confusing
and should have no precedential weight.
Another Tenth Circuit case, decided before Brittain, exhibits a
similar flaw. In United States v. Cattle King Packing Co., Inc.,8° the
defendant, an officer and shareholder of a corporation, was charged
with the intentional violation of the Federal Meat Inspection Act
("FMIA") ,181 a strict liability statute imposing misdemeanor penalties
but allowing for felony penalties for intentional violations. 18  The
court issued the RCO jury instruction and the defendant was found
guilty despite his absence from the facility at the time of the alleged
unlawful activity.'18
Notwithstanding the instruction, however, the court in Cattle King
did not completely dispense with the mens rea requirement.184
Instead, it focused on convincing evidence presented by the Govern-
ment (and its forty witnesses) of the officer's actual knowledge of the
violations of which the prosecution complained.'"a Specifically, the
prosecution established that while absent, the defendant monitored
the facility's operation. This was accomplished through phone calls
and occasional visits to the plant made to ensure that the policies and
practices that he directed, were in fact being carried out.'86 Based
on these facts, Cattle King does not support the application of the
178. See id. at 1420. The Government in Brittain never suggested that it was relying on the
RCO doctrine and the jury never was presented with the theory; the RCO language was
introduced on the court's own volition. See id. at 1418-19.
179. See id. at 1420.
180. 793 F.2d 232 (10th Cir. 1986).
181. 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-95. (1994). SeeUnited States v. Cattle King Packing Co., 793 F.2d 232,
239 (10th Cir. 1986) (declaring that packing company violated FIMA "at about every turn":
adulterated meat was shipped, meat was misdated, and rejected meat products were "reworked"
and resold to avoid economic loss).
182. See Cattle King, 793 F.2d at 240; see also 21 U.S.C. § 676 (providing that "if such violation
involves intent to defraud. . . such person, firm, or corporation shall be subject [to fines or
imprisonment]").
183. See Cattle King, 793 F.2d. at 240 (reasoning that "whoever aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces, or procures the commission of a criminal act by another is himself
punishable as a principal').
184. See i. at 241 (concluding that there was sufficient evidence that defendant had requisite
intent to defraud).
185. See id. at 235.
186. See id.
1996] LIMITATIONS ON THE RCO DOCTRINE
RCO doctrine in the absence of proof of a defendant's culpability.
Ergo, it certainly does not support any expansion of the doctrine.
The court in Cattle King, however, like the court in Brittain, set forth
in dicta a broad and somewhat confusing analysis of the RCO
doctrine. First, it stated correctly that without more, the RCO
instruction cannot suffice in a felony context.18 7 Unfortunately,
though, the court then permitted the RCO (strict liability) instruction,
despite record facts sufficient to establish the requisite mens rea
independent of the instruction."tu As a result, the possibility now exists
that such an instruction will be approved in future cases in which the
facts do not show truly culpable knowledge. 89 This could lead to
results that are at odds with prevailing mens rea doctrine.9 0
The third category of cases consists of those in which courts have
relied erroneously on some variant of the RCO doctrine to dispense
with mens rea, upholding liability based solely on an individual's
corporate position. Commentators cite the Third Circuit's decision
in United States v. Johnson & Towers1' most often for this proposi-
tion.192 In that case, the court intimated, for the first time, that the
RCO doctrine could be applied to negate an express mens rea
requirement in an environmental statute.93 In Johnson & Towers,
187. See id. at 240-41.
188. See id. at 241.
189. See Sayre, supra note 1, at 79. Sayre writes:
The danger is that in the case of true crimes where the penalty is severe and the need
for ordinary criminal law safeguards is strong, courts following the false analogy of the
public welfare offenses may now and again ... relax the mens rea requirement,
particularly in the case of unpopular crimes, as the easiest way to secure desired
convictions.
Id.
190. See Zarky, supra note 24, at 991-92 (pointing out that rationale in Cattle King could be
unfairly and inaccurately applied in future cases); see also State v. Kailua Auto Wreckers, Inc., 615
P.2d 730 (Haw. 1980). Kailua Auto Wreckers involved a state environmental statute that was silent
as to any scienter requirement. See id. at 733 n.2. The Supreme Court of Hawaii affirmed the
conviction of defendant corporate officers who openly had burned automobiles in violation of
pollution regulations. See id. at 739-40. The defendants claimed that they were unconstitu-
tionally discriminated against by selective law enforcement. See id. at 734-35. Given the
uncontradicted evidence that violations were "flagrant," "continuous," and committed knowingly,
see id. at 733, the outcome of Kailua Auto Wreckers appears to be correct. Because the Supreme
Court of Hawaii read the statute as one imposing "strict liability" with a Dotteyweich/Park "public
welfare" analysis, however, the court established erroneous precedent with respect to the
fundamental mens rea requirement. See id. at 738-39.
191. 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984).
192. See Kevin L. Colbert, Considerations of the Scienter Requirement and the Responsible Corporate
Officer Doctrine for Knowing Violations of Environmental Statutes, 33 S. TEX. L. REV. 699, 713-14
(1992) (noting that Johnson & Towers represents first example of corporate officer held strictly
liable under RCRA).
193. See United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 670 (3d Cir. 1984).
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two officers of the defendant-corporation were convicted of the illegal
disposal of chemicals classified under RCRA as hazardous waste.1 4
On appeal, the only issue before the Third Circuit was the
definition of the word "person" within the meaning of the statute. 95
In addressing the question, the court held that employees, as well as
owners and operators of a facility, could be liable under RORA
provided that the violator "knew or should have known" of the
unlawful conduct.'96 The court reasoned that Congress' purpose in
enacting RCRA would be controverted by limiting its applicability to
owners and operators if other employees also "bear responsibility" for
handling hazardous materials.
197
Johnson & Towers, however, has far greater significance for its dicta
than it does for its holding. In dicta, the Third Circuit in that case
likened RCRA's "knowing" requirement to the strict liability provision
of the FDCA addressed by the Supreme Court in Dotterweich and
Park.9 Classifying RCRA as a "public welfare statute," the court
averred that it would be reasonable to read the relevant provision as
not requiring mens rea.1t It then admitted that ultimately such a
reading would be "arbitrary and nonsensical when applied to [RCRA]"
and hence did not adopt such a construction." The court applied
a theory, however, that can be characterized in essentially the same
way. It pronounced that an employee's knowledge can be inferred
solely on the basis of his corporate position, suggesting that the RCO
doctrine validly may create status offenses in the context of RCRA
violations.201
Like the Third Circuit in Johnson & Towers, the Fourth Circuit also
has applied the RCO doctrine rigidly when the defendants were not
even corporate officers. In United States v. Dee,2" 2 civilian engineers
employed by the government were charged with having stored,
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id. at 665.
197. See id. at 667 (stating that "'the justification of the penalties section [of RCRA] is to
permit a broad variety of mechanisms so as to stop the illegal disposal of hazardous wastes'
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, at 31 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CA.N. 6238, 6269)).
198. See id. at 666-67.
199. See id. at 668.
200. Id.
201. See id. at 670; see also Steven M. Morgan & Allison K. Obermann, Perils of the Profession:
Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine May Facilitate a Dramatic Increase In Criminal Prosecutions Of
Environmental Offenders, 45 Sw. LJ. 1199, 1204-05 (1991). These commentators note that the
RCO doctrine was not so-labeled by the Fourth Circuit, but that the court issued to the jury the
RCO instruction, and thus the case has been classified accordingly. They state further that
courts have held that "ignorance of the law is no defense" when applying the RCO doctrine.
202. 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990).
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treated, and disposed of hazardous waste without a permit.1°3
Applying the public welfare rationale, the court held that "'where...
dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste
materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so great that
anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with
them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation."'24
In Dee, the court found evidence that the defendants were aware of
at least the possibility of RCRA violations, yet they failed to ensure the
proper handling of the hazardous waste. 0 Thus, in light of settled
mens rea doctrine, the holding in Dee arguably seemsjustifiable. Such
a dilution of the mens rea principle by resort to the RCO doctrine,
however, cannot be rectified.0 6
IV. THE COMMENTATORS
Several commentators have proposed that application of the RCO
doctrine be extended to environmental crimes.0 7 Like the court in
Johnson & Towers, these commentators begin with the premise that
environmental protection statutes are public welfare provisions in the
203. United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 743 (4th Cir. 1990).
204. i& at 745 (quoting United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558,
565 (1971)).
205. See id. at 748.
206. See In re Dougherty, 482 N.W.2d 485, 488 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that, in civil
case involving $10,000 penalty, defendant-corporate president could be held liable under RCO
doctrine for hazardous waste violations, notwithstanding insufficient evidence that he directly
participated in alleged infractions, directed other employees, or ignored environmental
regulations). Other environmental cases not discussed within the text of this Comment suggest
the validity of dispensing with the mens rea requirement and essentially applying the RCO
doctrine without so-classifying their analyses. See, e.g., United States v. Baytank Houston, Inc.,
934 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding thatspecific intentwas not required to support conviction
of corporate defendant for failure to report release of hazardous chemicals); United States v.
Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that knowledge regarding permit require-
ment was not required for statutory violation). Several other cases have ratified the conviction
of defendant-corporate officers without proof of actual knowledge, but on a basis other than
inferring knowledge via corporate position. See, eg., United States v. Carr, 880 F.2d 1550 (2d
Cir. 1989) (upholding conviction of corporate officer under statutory scheme requiring
defendant to protect, prevent, and abate release of hazardous illegal substances into
environment); United States v. Greer, 850 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir. 1988) (reversing decision of
lower court to set aside guilty verdict for unlawfully dumping hazardous waste when defendant
knowingly effected disposal); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986)
(reversing decision of lower court to set aside guilty verdict when evidence demonstrated that
defendant knowingly transported hazardous waste for purpose of illegal dumping).
207. See Block &Voisin, supra note 16, at 1357 (suggesting that RCO "merely raises inference
that corporate officer possessed knowiedge of the offense"); Heep, supra note 2, at 722
(suggesting that "[c] ourts should still make use of some form of the RCO doctrine in order to
implement congressional intent in RCRA criminal cases"); Milne, supra note 14, at 309
(proposing that best way to remedy ill effects of pollution is to "actively pursue" criminal
convictions of corporate policy makers for environmental violations).
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same sense as the term has been applied to food and drug laws.2" 8
Accordingly, they argue that requisite levels of mens rea in such
statutes should be lowered 2" or dispensed with entirely.21
One commentator suggests that the application of the RCO
doctrine to environmental laws is legitimate because, in his view,
Congress intentionally has left the definition of "knowingly"-insofar
as the term applies to such statutes-to be decided by the courts.21 1
The courts, he argues, have the right to interpret these provisions by
applying whatever vehicles they deem appropriate, including the RCO
doctrine.212 He proffers that "[b]y not defining 'knowingly,' Con-
gress recognized that the definition is not static, but rather changes
according to modem jurisprudence and congressional guidance. 21 3
This Comment suggests, quite to the contrary, that the meaning of
the "knowing" requirement in American criminal law is one of the few
constants by which the law separates those who act criminally from
those who simply act carelessly.2 4 The Supreme Court's decision
in Staples refutes this commentator's theory as well.215
Another commentator's view evidences the emotional and moral,
but not legal, principles on which he and some others base their
arguments for strict liability environmental crimes." 6 He cites a
prevalence of" [e]motionalism" and "anger" over corporate America's
ambivalent and "callous attitude" toward the environment.217
Emotionalism and anger are understandable and appropriate
reactions to pollution and environmental destruction.218 Such
208. See Block & Voisin, supra note 16, at 1349 (asserting that it is well established that
environmental laws are public welfare statutes); Heep, supra note 2, at 722 (comparing
ambiguous mens rea requirement of FDCA with that of RCRA).
209. See Heep, supra note 2, at 723.
210. See Milne, supra note 14, at 335-36 (arguing that greater effort should be made to hold
corporate officers strictly liable for environmental violations).
211. See Heep, supra note 2, at 723.
212. See id.
213. Id.; cf Gabbett, supra note 14, at 57 ("Fortunately, some court decisions have
effectuated the statutory purpose of public protection when construing the regulations
concerning waste handling by imposing liability on corporate officers without a specific showing
of intent.").
214. See supra notes 25-39 and accompanying text.
215. In Stapes, the Government argued that Congress intended to do away with the relevant
intent requirement in order to aid in obtaining convictions. See Staples v. United States, 114 S.
Ct. 1793, 1802 n.11 (1994). The Supreme Court maintained that "if Congress thinks it necessary
to reduce the Government's burden [of proof], ... it remains free to amend 28 U.S.C.
§ 5861(d) by explicitly eliminating a mens rea requirement." Id.
216. See Colbert, supra note 192, at 700 (indicating that public is angry and emotional over
environmental crime).
217. See id.
218. The author is an avid animal rights activist and is a strong proponent of maintaining
a clean and safe environment for all living things. She too is angered and upset by damage
inflicted upon the water, the air, and the earth's surface.
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responses, however, are an inadequate basis for reordering settled
principles of jurisprudence, such as the mens rea requirement, and
would be directed more appropriately to the legislature, rather than
to the courts.
A third commentator argues that because environmental crimes
result in harms of great magnitude, they are more reprehensible than
most traditional crimes and warrant a complete negation of any
scienter requirement21 9 He proposes that the best way to address
environmental violations is to pursue actively the convictions of high-
level corporate officers on a wide scale basis. 22 ' Despite the moral
appeal of this conclusion, such an endeavor still must entail the
finding of proof as to an officer's culpability, if only through
circumstantial evidence, to harmonize with the mens rea principle.
In general, several commentators have observed that determining
corporate-officer criminal responsibility, within the context of
environmental crimes, is difficult. 2 1  It often is relatively easy to
assign knowledge to lower-level employees who actually handle
hazardous waste; but it is more onerous to prove the culpability of a
superior who may have directed the unlawful activity.22 2 This argu-
ment seems as compelling as any for upholding a corporate officer's
conviction on the basis of company position. Notwithstanding this
difficulty encountered by prosecutors, however, proof of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt, which includes some level of mental culpability
on behalf of the officer, still is required by law.223 The integrity of
the American criminal justice system depends on the uncompromising
adherence to its nucleus-the mens rea principle.
Certain commentators also observe that imposing strict criminal
liability on corporate officers would serve as a deterrent insofar as
officers presumably would be more likely to take investigative and
precautionary measures than they would absent the risk of strict
219. See Milne, supra note 14, at 319-20, 336 (stating that standards of proof that courts have
imposed for proving environmental crimes are "tantamount to strict liability," and that more
convictions would occur if government aggressively pursued these opportunities).
220. See id. at 309, 336.
221. See i&. at 332 (characterizing knowledge standard of environmental violation as "the
major stumbling block" to prosecution); see also Colbert, supra note 192, at 701-02 (stating that
application of respondeat superior typically is not used for criminal violations requiring mens
rea); Heep, supra note 2, at 700 (noting ambiguity in using RGO doctrine to facilitate showing
of mens rea).
222. See Heep, supra note 2, at 722. But see Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 434
(1985) (observing that government may prove knowledge of illegal activity indirectly by
.reference to facts and circumstances surrounding the cases that [the defendant] knew that his
conduct was unauthorized or illegal").
223. See supra Part I.A.
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liability.224 This argument, although powerful, is subject to the same
criticism given above: it undercuts the mens rea principle. In
addition, it bears consideration that when proof of a defendant's




As discussed above, recommendations to expand the RCO doctrine
persist and courts undoubtedly will continue to be urged to apply the
doctrine in other areas of law.26 This Comment suggests that
expanded application of the doctrine, that is, any application beyond
narrow factual settings like those present in Dotterweich and Park, is not
justifiable.227 This conclusion follows from, and is supported by, a
number of factors, including policy considerations.
First, there is reason to question whether the imposition of strict
criminal liability on corporate officers will, in the long run, create
socially desirable incentives. In the short run, admittedly, some
corporate officers will be motivated to act assiduously to ensure
compliance with putative public welfare enactments. Ultimately
though, the possibility of strict criminal liability, involving the
payment of substantial, uninsurable, and non-indemnifiable penalties,
224. See Heep, supra note 2, at 731. But see SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND
ITs PROCESSES 198-202 (4th ed. 1983) (pointing out difficulties in determining actual deterrent
effects of criminal sanctions).
225. In contrast to the beliefs of these commentators, others analyze the RCO doctrine in
a fashion that is harmonious with the mens rea principle. See Hartman & De Monaco, supra
note 79, at 10,153 (stating that RCO doctrine should not eliminate statute's knowledge
requirement and criminal enforcement may not always be appropriate course of action,
particularly when it cannot be proved, by circumstantial evidence or otherwise, that relevant
corporate officer had actual knowledge of unlawful activity at issue); Richard S. Porter,
Environmental Law: Does the Application of the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine Apply to the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act?, 16 S. ILL. U. LJ. 687, 687-88 (1992) (arguing that if RCO
doctrine may be applied to RCRA without express congressional intent, every "public welfare"
statute could similarly be reduced to create strict liability offense---"a mammoth undertaking
that is properly left to Congress and not to the courts"); Zarky, supra note 24, at 994 (suggesting
that problem of deterring corporate officers from directing or permitting unlawful activity is
more appropriately addressed through civil liability system than through criminal law).
226. At least one court has refused to apply the RCO doctrine in contexts other than
environmental regulation. In Beaulieu v. RSJ, Inc., 532 N.W.2d 610 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), the
court held that the RCO doctrine could not be invoked to impose strict criminal liability on
corporate officers for the violation of a state employment discrimination statute when the statute
required that the defendant "know or should know" of the discriminatory act. See id. at 618-14.
The attempt to invoke the doctrine in such a case, however, indicates the potential for its
expansion beyond the environmental context. See supra note 84 and accompanying text
(describing expansion of "public welfare" terminology to wide range of statutes such as
environmental and criminal).
227. See supra Part II.
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as well as lengthy prison sentences, is likely to dissuade capable and
responsible individuals from accepting jobs that carry such a
prospect 28 Accordingly, an expanded application of the RGO
doctrine may in fact have the ironic and undesired effect of ensuring
that critical organizational positions-for example, those responsible
for implementing a company's environmental compliance mea-
sures-are staffed by less capable and perhaps, more importantly, by
less "risk averse" individuals.
Second, the preeminence of the mens rea requirement in criminal
law, as indicated by Staples and a host of earlier decisions, does not
merely reflect a recent policy choice. Both the English and the
American legal systems have recognized criminal intent as an essential
element of criminal liability for hundreds of years. This fact exhibits,
at least in part, the settled judgment that overall societal interests are
best served when the severe burden of criminal liability and punish-
ment are reserved for those with "guilty minds" 29 and are not
imposed simply as an extra incentive to assist in achieving narrower
goals such as environmental safety. Accordingly, displacement or
dilution of the mens rea requirement to advance such goals, should
not be taken lightly.
In this same vein, use of an expanded RGO doctrine as a tool to
engineer environmental safety might have unfair and discriminatory
effects.2" For example, utilizing the doctrine to hold corporate
officials, as a class of defendants, strictly criminally liable subjects
them to risks and burdens that others in society do not face.
Regardless of whether this creates concerns of constitutional
dimension,231 such an application would give rise to questions of
fairness and of whether a system in which strict criminal liability is a
risk for some but not others, will command public respect.
232
Finally, as noted above, this Comment maintains that the primary
purpose of the ciminal law is to punish wrongdoers retrospectively,
and not to stimulate behavior prospectively. For all of the above-
228. SeeZarky, supra note 24, at 994 (recognizing that to hold officers strictly liable may deter
people who have expertise from taking corporate positions for fear of prosecution).
229. See supra notes 25-39 and accompanying text.
230. See KADISH, supra note 224, at 198-202 (pointing out that ability to determine deterrent
effects of criminal sanctions is limited by inability to eliminate other factors that could account
for changed behavior).
231. See Zarky, supra note 24, at 994 (suggesting that disparate treatment of employees may
result in equal protection problem).
232. See Anthony A. Cuomo, Mens Rea and Status Criminaliy, 40 S. CALL. REV. 463, 518-19
(1967) (stating that strict liability unnecessarily "establishes a standard [that] can only breed
frustration and disrespect for the law ... [by] impos[ing] criminal sanctions irrespective of
care").
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mentioned reasons then, this Comment thus recommends that the
United States Department of Justice and the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency reflect the necessity of proving knowing conduct when
writing their respective corporate investigative policies.
CONCLUSION
The RCO doctrine, under which corporate officials can be subject
to criminal liability for the violation of so-called "public welfare"
statutes without any showing of actual criminal intent, should not be
expanded to achieve modem regulatory goals, even those as worthy
as environmental safety. The doctrine arose in the context of food
and drug regulation; yet even in this narrow context, its vitality was
and is uncertain. On close reading, the Supreme Court's decisions in
Dotterweich and Park do not appear to provide unequivocal approval of
the RCO doctrine. Although a few subsequent cases have invoked the
doctrine to justify the imposition of strict criminal liability in the
context of environmental regulations, an overwhelming majority of
decisions, despite confusing or misleading dicta, has rejected efforts
to extend its use.
233
With the Supreme Court's recent reaffirmation of the significance
of the mens rea requirement in cases such as Staples and X-Citement,
it appears unlikely that the Court would sanction any expanded
application of the RCO doctrine. Finally, there are significant policy
considerations that weigh heavily against expanded use of the
doctrine at the expense of the mens rea requirement, which is
fundamental to American criminal jurisprudence.
233. See Richard G. Singer, The Myth of the Doctrine of the Responsible Corporate Officer, 6 Toxics
L. REP. (BNA) No. 44, at 1378, 1381 (Apr. 8, 1992). Singer states:
At the very best, an impartial reader would have to say that [these] decisions are
uncertain and conflicting, that they often contain language that suggests the [c]ourt
is embracing strict liability, but that their holdings consistently refuse to go that far.
Still these are the cases that created the RCO myth in the environmental field ....
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